“Scholarly Harassment” and the Sisterhood of Academia

A new proposal designed to shield female scholars from criticism will destroy the university.

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About the Author

James L. Nuzzo, PhD, is an exercise scientist and men’s health researcher. Dr. Nuzzo has published over 80 research articles in peer-reviewed journals. He writes regularly about exercise, men’s health, and academia at The Nuzzo Letter, with additional writings appearing at Reality’s Last Stand and Australians for Science & Freedom. In 2025, Dr. Nuzzo documented his academic cancellation using a freedom of information request. He is active on X @JamesLNuzzo.

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In 2023, June Gruber and four other female academics in the United States introduced a new concept into the academic lexicon: scholarly harassment. They defined it as “repeated mistreatment relating to one’s scholarly work, conduct or capabilities that is threatening, humiliating or intimidating,” and suggested that it applies almost exclusively to women (“female-identifying scholars”).

To my knowledge, this concept—despite its potential to reshape academic life— has attracted little critical commentary. Thus, to address this void in academic discourse, I outline several problems with the concept of scholarly harassment, including the predictable damage it would inflict on university scholarship if institutionalized.

What Constitutes “Scholarly Harassment”?

The most immediate problem with Gruber and colleagues’ scholarly harassment concept—beyond its built-in sex bias—is that it rests almost entirely on subjective emotional states: humiliation, intimidation, and threat. This renders it unworkable as a policy framework. The fact that a female academic feels humiliated by criticism of her work tells us nothing about whether the criticism is fair, accurate, or necessary.

Different scholars inevitably respond differently to critique. One woman may interpret a criticism as harassment; another may regard the same comment as standard scholarly disagreement. A concept so dependent on individual emotional reactions has no objective footing on which policy can stand.

The proposal is further undermined by its vagueness. While the authors provide examples of scholarly harassment, the list is so expansive that it raises more questions than it answers. These examples include:

• “personality slander”

• “side comments, hallway chatter and word-of-mouth rumours”

• “unwarranted slights about the innovation” of her work

• “accusations that [her] research and/or teaching is ‘unscientific,’ ‘lacking in rigour’, or ‘not objective’”

• “unsubstantiated complaints or allegations of wrongdoing or scientific misconduct”

• “discounting [her] ability to train students”

• “judgments about physical appearance”

• “intimidation to include co-authors on manuscripts”

• “suggestions in public domains (for example, social media) that [her] work requires unusual scrutiny or should be retracted without formal investigate process”

• women being “judged as unserious about their career or unprofessional” if they have a child before tenure or need to reschedule meeting to care for sick children

• women being asked to “alter their behaviour…to align with gender expectations”

• women being asked about “marital status during job interviews or potential childbearing plans”

Here, I will focus on one especially troubling claim: that calling a woman’s research “unscientific,” “non-objective,” or “lacking in rigor” constitutes scholarly harassment.